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Kant and the Problem of “True Eloquence”
Abstract: This article argues that Kant’s attack on the ars oratoria in §53
of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is directed against eighteenth-
century school rhetoric, in particular against the “art of speech”
(Redekunst) of Johann Christoph Gottsched. It is pointed out that Kant
suggests a revision of Gottsched’s conception of “true eloquence,”
which was the predominant rhetorical ideal at the time. On this basis,
and in response to recent discussions on “Kantian rhetoric,” Kant’s
own ideal of speech is addressed. It emerges that he favors a culture
of speech embedded inmoral cultivation,which excludes anydisciplin-
ary form of rhetoric.
Keywords: Kant, rhetoric, eloquence, Gottsched, Critique of the
Power of Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION: KANT AND THE CHALLENGE OF
RHETORIC
T
he relationship between philosophy and rhetoric is tradi-
tionally tense, but it should not be mistaken for merely
antagonistic. Philosophy cannot simply refrain frommaking
use of persuasive speech; it can be reduced neither to deductive logic
nor to mere fact-stating. This is particularly true in practical delibera-
tion: since antiquity, eloquence has had its place in the realm of
“human affairs,” where certainty is not available. Thus, from the
beginnings of their discipline, philosophers had to look for responses
to the challenge of rhetoric and tried to tame the power of eloquence
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by adjusting it to their own principles. Socrates’s ambition for “true
rhetoric” (alethine rhetorike) can serve as a classical example.1
How did Kant, the modern champion of practical reason, respond
to this challenge? In fact, his case is highly intricate. At first sight he is
clearly opposed to any preoccupation with rhetoric. Notorious in this
regard is §53 of the Critique of the Power of Judgmentwhere Kant accuses
the art of persuasion of deceiving “by means of beautiful illusion” and
deploying “the machines of persuasion” (5:327).2 Kant apparently
defames the art of speech as “artful trickery” (5:327) and as a “deceitful
art” (5:328 fn.). Thus, it is hardly surprising that most commentators
take it for granted that Kant felt nothing but contempt for rhetoric.3
Yet it has been pointed out that, on closer inspection, things are more
complicated than that. The attack on rhetoric in §53 is not directed at
“eloquence” (Beredsamkeit) as such, but “in so far as it is understood
as the art of persuasion” (5:327; emphasis added). This leaves room
for an alternative notion of eloquence. In a footnote in the same para-
graph, Kant is most explicit on what this alternative notion could be.
At the same time, it is the only occasion Kant uses the German word
“Rhetorik” in his third Critique:
Eloquence and well-spokenness (together, rhetoric) belong to beautiful
art; but the art of the orator (ars oratoria), as the art of using the weak-
ness of people for one’s own purposes (however well-intentioned or
even really good these may be) is not worthy of any respect at all.
[. . .] He who has at his command, along with clear insight into the
facts, language in all its richness and purity, and who, along with a
fruitful imagination capable of presenting his ideas, feels a lively sym-
pathy for the true good, is the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the speaker
without art but full of vigor, as Cicero would have him, though he
did not himself always remain true to this ideal. (5:328n)
1Plato, Gorgias 517a.
2References to Kant use the volume and page number of the Academy Edition,
indicated in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by P. Guyer
and A.W. Wood. Translations have occasionally been corrected. Translations from
all other eighteenth-century sources are the author’s.
3R. J. Dostal, “Kant and Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 13 (1980): 223–244
(pp. 225–236); J. Bender/D. E. Wellbery, “Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of
Rhetoric,” in J. Bender and D. E. Wellbery, ed., The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory,
Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 3–39 (p. 18f.); T. Bezzola, Die
Rhetorik bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel. Ein Beitrag zur Philosophiegeschichte der Rhetorik
(Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2012); Br. Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of
Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2006),
84–112; D.P. Abbott, “Kant, Theremin, and the Morality of Rhetoric.” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 40 (2007): 274–292.
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Obviously, two senses of rhetoric are in play in this passage.4 In the
first sentence, Kant distinguishes “rhetoric” (Rhetorik) sharply from
“the art of the orator” (Rednerkunst). His disrespect does not affect
what he himself calls “rhetoric,” namely “eloquence” (Beredtheit) com-
bined with excellence of speech or, more literally, “well-spokenness”
(Wohlredenheit). It is the “art of the orator” alone that he denies respect.
This art is contemptible since it makes use of human weaknesses in
order to manipulate; it is an art “of deceiving by means of beautiful
illusion” (5:327). What Kant himself calls “rhetoric” (Rhetorik), how-
ever, is classified as a “beautiful art” (schöne Kunst).5
What rhetorical ideal is in play here? In the second sentence cited
above, Kant gives a short explanation by referring to the notion of the
vir bonus dicendi peritus, usually translated as “good man, speaking
well.” In Roman rhetoric, this phrase expresses the ideal of a speaker
whose rhetorical excellence is essentially based on morality. But Kant
seems to allude to an alternative interpretation of this ideal, when
he renders it as “speaker without art, but full of vigor” (Redner ohne
Kunst, aber voll Nachdruck). What does he have in mind? When Kant
explains that the speaker needs “insight into facts,” “command of
language,” “imagination” and “lively sympathy for the true good,”
he clearly points to an alternative kind of speech practice that is distin-
guished from the art of persuasion. Should we therefore believe that
there is something like a “Kantian rhetoric”?
Recently, it has been claimed that this is indeed the case. Most
comprehensively, Scott R. Stroud argued that there is a “nonmanipula-
tive rhetoric of reason that can be extracted from Kant,” a rhetoric that
can best be “labeled as educative rhetoric, since it serves as rhetorical
means to non-coercively move others toward more beneficial, moral-
ized, and virtuous states.”6 In this view, Kant, just like Socrates, enter-
tains his own idea of “true rhetoric.” Even though he does not spell it
out, there is a conception implied in Kant’s work of how speech can
be persuasive and yet “nonmanipulative.” In order to understand the
4See Sc. Stroud, “Kant, Rhetoric, and the Challenges of Freedom.” Advances in
the History of Rhetoric 18 (2015): 181–194 (p. 187).
5For the literal translation of ‘schöne Kunst’ as ‘beautiful art’ see the translator’s
notice in I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, transl. P. Guyer and E. Matthews
(Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 304n.
6Sc. Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric (University Park: Penn State
University Press, 2014), 235. Stroud’s fine study cannot be done justice within the
scope of this article, which mainly focusses on an issue absent from Stroud. For some
comments see L. Leeten, “Scott R. Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric” (Book
Review), International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2016), 263–266.
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vital role of this particular kind of eloquence in Kantian moral cultiva-
tion, Kant’s rhetorical ideal should be made explicit.
In the following, this view will be critically examined. I will argue
that although the notion of a Kantian rhetoric is a striking idea, one has
to bemore cautious than Stroud. It is certainly right that Kant responds
to the challenge of rhetoric and that he entertains his own ideal of elo-
quence. However, Kant shows a deep and bitter contempt for the “art
of speech” that has to be accounted for. It is misguided to say that Kant
simply “overemphasized” the dark side of rhetoric.7 In fact, it is not
just the evil-minded art of rhetorical manipulation that he despises
but rather any art of speech. A reconstruction of “Kant’s rhetoric”
can only be appropriate if it does justice to this fundamental contempt.
In order to sort things out, I will in the following section try to
reconstruct what the term “art of speech” signified at the time the third
Critique was being written. This will emerge when Kant’s stance on
rhetoric is reconnected to eighteenth-century school rhetoric, which
went under the heading of “art of speech” (Redekunst). Kant’s dismis-
sive statements in §53 of the third Critiquewill be much more intelligi-
ble when one is aware of what system of rhetoric was usually taught in
his times. Disciplinary rhetoric was almost exclusively represented by
one person: Johann Christoph Gottsched. Even though he has received
no attention in the discussion on Kant’s views on eloquence so far,
Gottsched was the leading figure of rhetoric in Kant’s world, and his
work Comprehensive Art of Speech (Ausführliche Redekunst) dominated
rhetorical education in the eighteenth century (section II). Since this
doctrine suggests a way that reason can rightfully make use of effica-
cious speech, Gottsched stood not least for a particular response to
the challenge of rhetoric. Central to this response is the distinction
between two kinds of eloquence Gottsched calls “true eloquence”
(wahre Beredsamkeit) and “false eloquence” (falsche Beredsamkeit). This
solution was familiar to those who went through the institutions
of higher education, so that Kant was without any doubt well aware
of it. A closer look will help to explain why he dismisses not just
the manipulative art of persuasion but the “art of speech” in general
(section III).
In the remaining sections, Kant’s own ideal of speech is redressed.
First it will be shown that Gottschedian rhetoric is precisely the con-
ception of rhetoric Kant repudiates. More specifically, his remarks in
the first footnote to §53 of the third Critique seem to be directed against
the version of “true eloquence” proposed by the art of speech Kant
7Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, cited in n. 6 above, p. 16.
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knew from contemporary textbooks. Here, the main point of dissent is
Kant’s conviction that any doctrine of rhetoric will inevitably lead to a
“mechanical” use of speech, which in his view is generally despicable.
For Kant, true eloquence could never result from a system but only, as
I will argue, from a culture of speech (section IV). This obviously poses
a problem for any systematic reconstruction of “Kantian rhetoric,” as it
is in danger ofmissing the very point of Kant’s ideal of speech. There is
a reason why Kant does not give us more than a few hints. However,
based on the remarks in §53, in particular the passage from the foot-
note cited above, his notion of an ideal speaker can at least be outlined.
For this purpose, the formula vir bonus dicendi peritus, which is explai-
ned as ”speaker without art but full of vigor,”will serve as a guideline:
according to Kant, speech has to be “without art” (ohne Kunst), i.e., it
must never utilize rhetorical skills for specific purposes, no matter if
they are evil or moral. Rather, in the perfect speaker, rhetorical and
ethical virtue will form a unity (section V). The question then remains
how speech, purified of rhetorical “means” and reduced to a virtuous
person’s natural way of speaking, can ever be forceful. If speech is
“without art,” how can it gain “vigor” (Nachdruck)? To answer this
question the larger project of the third Critique to bridge the “gulf”
between nature and freedom has to be recalled. It is one of the central
thoughts of Kant’s aesthetics that the ideas of practical reason have to
be endowed with reality, and that beauty is key to this. This has to be
kept in mind when Kant classifies “rhetoric” (Rhetorik) as a “beautiful
art”: ideally, it is a practice of speech that makes morality attractive by
virtue of its form (section VI). Summing up, it can be said that in Kant’s
view rhetorical force is legitimate only if it does not result from rhetor-
ical studies. Speech is allowed to be persuasive exclusively by virtue
of the speaker’s morality: an efficacy that can never be guaranteed
(section VII).
II. GOTTSCHED’S “ART OF SPEECH”: RHETORIC IN KANT’S
TIMES
From today’s perspective, eighteenth-century rhetoric tends to
vanish behind aesthetics. At that time rhetoric was being transformed
into the new discipline, most prominently in Baumgarten’s Aesthetica
from 1750. In retrospect, this decline of rhetoric cannot be overlooked.
However, from the viewpoint of the eighteenth century itself, the dis-
cipline of rhetoric was still alive. In particular, it was an inherent part
of the curricula. Since the late seventeenth century, rhetoric had been
established as a part of the school system in the German speaking
world, and universities followed this development in the first half of
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the eighteenth century.8 That rhetoric began to decline in the middle of
the century does not change the fact that the discipline was taught
until at least 1788.9
Thus, rhetoric was a mandatory part of Kant’s university studies.
The institutions confronted himwith a certain solution to its challenge.
Whatwas this solution? To answer this questionwe have to turn to the
leading figure of curricular rhetoric at the time: Johann Christoph
Gottsched. This figure has so far been neglected in the discourse about
Kant’s relation to rhetoric; scholars who tackle the question nevermen-
tion his name.10 Therefore, some general words on Gottsched’s influ-
ence seem necessary.
Gottsched, raised in Königsberg, was a prototypical proponent of
the early German rationalist Enlightenment. Since 1734, he was a full
professor at the University of Leipzig and a leading figure of this elite
institution. As an editor of journals, a writer and playwright, a transla-
tor, a scholar of poetics, literary theory and rhetoric, Gottsched was
a famous man and omnipresent in public intellectual life.11 He was
engaged in the popularization of science: his Erste Gründe der gesamten
Weltweisheit was a widely used textbook in schools and universities,
with five editions between 1733 and 1748.12
Rhetoric can be considered essential to Gottsched’s endeavors.13
With his “German Society” (Deutsche Gesellschaft) in Leipzig he created
institutional structures for the spreading of his rhetorical ideas and lan-
guage reforms. This was noticeable in Kant’s hometown as well: at the
instigation of Gottsched, Christian C. Flottwell founded a subsidiary of
8W. Barner, Barockrhetorik. Untersuchungen zu ihren geschichtlichen Grundlagen
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1970), 241–447.
9H. Bosse, “Dichter kann man nicht bilden. Zur Geschichte der Schulrhetorik
nach 1770.” Jahrbuch für internationale Germanistik 10 (1978), 80–125.
10Garsten (Saving Persuasion, cited in n. 3 above, pp. 93–104) and Stroud (Kant
and the Promise of Rhetoric, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 16–27) take eighteenth-century
‘popular philosophy’ (Popularphilosophie) as Kant’s major opponent and overlook
the significance of school rhetoric in this matter. In fact, neither of them mentions that
rhetoric was still a school subject and that university students took classes in rhetoric.
11B. Grosser, Gottscheds Redeschule. Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Beredsamkeit
in der Zeit der Aufklärung (Greifswald PhD dissertation, 1932); W. Rieck, Johann Christoph
Gottsched. Eine kritische Würdigung seines Werkes (Berlin: Akademie, 1972), 9–69;
E. Achermann, ed., Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–1766). Philosophie, Poetik und
Wissenschaft (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013).
12W. Schatzberg, “Gottsched as a Popularizer of Science.” MLN 83 (1968): 752–770
(p. 758f.). Kant owned a copy himself, as well as three books with prefaces by Gottsched:
Helvetius, von Muschenbroek, Terrasson. See A. Warda, Immanuel Kants Bücher (Berlin:
Breslauer, 1922), 35, 49 and 55.
13K. S. Roth, “Wissenschaftsrhetorik. Johann Christoph Gottscheds Ausführliche
Redekunst (1759) als Lehre vom Wissenstransfer”, Historiographia Linguistica 31 (2004),
329–344.
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the “German Society” in Königsberg in 1741, when Kant was an
undergraduate.14 Thus Flottwell, a strict Gottschedian, received a pro-
fessorship of rhetoric at the university of Königsberg, the second at this
institution, which had only nine full professorships altogether.15
Furthermore, Gottsched published textbooks that made his ver-
sion of rhetoric the official curricular doctrine.16 His Preliminary
Studies of Eloquence (Vorübungen der Beredsamkeit) from 1754 was a
handbook for grammar schools at a time when these institutions
began to use German instead of Latin textbooks. Later, Gottsched
provided a textbook to be used at universities: the Academic Art of
Speech (Akademische Redekunst) from 1759. Both works were based
on his opus magnum, the Comprehensive Art of Speech (Ausführliche
Redekunst), which had five editions between 1736 and 1759.17 This
work can be regarded as establishing the official rhetorical doctrine
of the time, and it is certainly justified to call it the most influential
handbook of German eighteenth-century rhetoric.18
Even if scholars did not use the books of Gottsched himself in
their classes, they were still in the sphere of his influence, for they
had to fall back on textbooks written by Gottschedians. Two scholars,
Lindheimer and Dommerich, had used the Ausführliche Redekunst as a
template for their textbooks even before Gottsched published one of
his own.19 Baumeister’s textbook Fundamentals of the Art of Speech
(Anfangsgründe der Redekunst) is a slavish imitation of Gottsched and
pays respect to him right from the beginning.20 Likewise, Braun pays
tribute to “the famous professor Gottsched” in the preface of his
14G. Krause, Gottsched und Flottwell, die Begründer der Königlichen Deutschen
Gesellschaft zu Königsberg in Preußen (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1893); Grosser,
Gottscheds Redeschule, 152; Rieck, Johann Christoph Gottsched, 91–93.
15Fr. Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und
Universitäten vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zur Gegenwart (Leipzig: von Veit, 1919)
vol. I, 550–552.
16Gunter E. Grimm writes in “Von der ‘politischen’ Oratorie zur ‘philosophi-
schen’ Redekunst. Wandlungen der deutschen Rhetorik in der Frühaufklärung.”
Rhetorik 3 (1983), 65–96 (p. 94): “Through his textbooks, written for grammar schools
and universities, Gottsched himself took care for the spreading of his rhetorical
reforms.”
17Roth, “Wissenschaftsrhetorik,” 331.
18D. Till, “Rhetoric in Western Europe: Germany,” in W. Donsbach, ed., The
International Encyclopedia of Communication, vol. X (Malden/London: Blackwell,
2008), 4371–4373.
19Grosser, Gottscheds Redeschule, cited in n. 11 above, p. 23; see J. Chr.
Dommerich, Anweisung zur wahren Beredsamkeit, zum Gebrauche seiner Vorlesungen
herausgegeben (Lemgo: Meyer, 1747).
20Fr. Chr. Baumeister, Anfangsgründe der Redekunst in kurzen Sätzen. Zum
Gebrauch der oratorischen Vorlesungen (Leipzig/Görlitz: Richter, 1751), 1f.
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Guide to German Art of Speech (Anleitung zur deutschen Redekunst).21
In this connection, it is important to note that lecturers in eighteenth-
century Germany were obliged to use such textbooks. This probably
explains why Gärtner, one of the pupils of Gottsched, kept using the
Comprehensive Art of Speech (Ausführliche Redekunst) in his lectures
even after he declared himself to have departed from his master.22
All this clearly indicates that Gottsched has to be regarded as the
major representative of German curricular rhetoric in the eighteenth
century, which goes under the heading of Redekunst, “art of speech”.
In the course of time, to be sure, the famous man was more and more
regarded as the prototype for an old-fashioned poetics of rules. The
decline of rhetorical art had a strong effect on Gottsched’s esteem.
Nevertheless, his rhetoric was still taught. That it was outdated when
Kant wrote his third Critique did not make it less perceptible in acade-
mia. It must only have made the term “art of speech” (Redekunst)
sound increasingly dubious.
On these grounds, Gottsched’s rhetoric can be regarded as a natu-
ral background for any reflection on eloquence during this period.
When Kant uses the word “Rednerkunst” in §53, he positively invokes
Gottsched’s school. But what answer did the Gottschedians offer to the
challenge of rhetoric? It is a well-triedmethod of philosophy to domes-
ticate the power of speech by binding it to reasons and truth. In this
view, speech is a medium that has to be secondary to the content it
conveys. Whereas philosophy is responsible for discovering the truth,
rhetoric is responsible for transmitting the truth. Gottsched’s rational-
ist approach to eloquence can be regarded as a variation of this solu-
tion. He treats the topic under the heading of “true eloquence.”
III. GOTTSCHED’S “TRUE ELOQUENCE”
When Gottsched separated true from false eloquence, he made use
of terms that were already circulating. Hallbauer in particular had pro-
videdadoctrineof rhetoric centeredaroundtruthand“trueeloquence.”23
But Gottsched’s rhetorical treatise from 1736 fixed the standards for
decades. What was the conception of the Comprehensive Art of Speech
(Ausführliche Redekunst)?
21H. Braun, Anleitung zur deutschen Redekunst (München: Ott, 1765), 4.
22Grosser, Gottscheds Redeschule, cited in n. 11 above, pp. 56 and 152f.
23Fr. A. Hallbauer, Anweisung zur Verbesserten Teutschen Oratorie (Jena: Hartung,
1725).
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Gottsched claims that reasons can only be sustainably persuasive
when derived from “good sources” (gute Quellen), i.e., from sources
that correspond to the “doctrine of reason” (Vernunftlehre) and with-
stand logical critique.24 The kind of eloquence that is persuasive in this
way Gottsched calls “true eloquence” (wahre Beredsamkeit). In contrast,
any persuasive speech that is produced by effective linguistic tech-
niques is called “false eloquence” (falsche Beredsamkeit): “The one elo-
quence that makes use of the former kind of reasons (Beweisgründe),
according with reason and truth (Vernunft und Wahrheit), we want
to term true; but the other, which makes use of illusory reasons
(Scheingründe) that in fact do not prove anything, wewant to term false
eloquence.”25
Thus Gottsched’s “reasonable guide to true eloquence”26 proceeds
by separating valid reasons sharply from expression, style and linguis-
tic presentation. False eloquence is false because it makes artful speech
intrude into reasoning and thus blurs the distinction between logic and
rhetoric. This will become especially obvious where “well-spokenness”
(Wohlredenheit) takes the lead: style can never be a valid reason since it
concerns the mere form of representation. As long as it stands alone,
well-spokenness will be, as Gottsched writes, “without spirit (Geist)
and force (Kraft), without truth (Wahrheit) and vigor (Nachdruck).”27
As soon as figures or tropes become the basis of argumentation elo-
quence is doomed to be false.28
Of course, this conception depends on a strict separation of cog-
nition, the rational activity, from the transmission of thoughts, the
rhetorical activity. But how can true eloquence be secured where con-
tent and style cannot be kept distinct so easily? Obviously, not every
fraudulent talk can be unmasked by its use of rhetorical figures, and
not every use of rhetorical figures justifies the accusation of false elo-
quence. The question of “true rhetoric” is so persistent because it is
no option to eliminate eloquence and transform speech into formal rea-
soning. True and false eloquence have to be kept distinct within the
practice of lively, rich, elegant and maybe even beautiful speech. For
Gottsched, this problem becomes particularly pressing when he places
speech in a process of enlightenmentwhere the “wiseman” (Weltweise)
speaks to the “ordinary kind of listeners” (gemeine Art der Zuhörer) and
people of “average understanding.”29 How can the expert be
24J. Chr. Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1736), 37.
25Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 37f.
26Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 31.
27Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 36.
28Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 73–79 or 107.
29Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 40–41.
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prevented from misusing his rhetorical skills? To this end,
Gottsched falls back on two strategies that have often been resorted
to in the history of rhetoric: speech has to be natural, and the speaker
has to be morally good.
That speech ought to be natural had already been demanded by
Socrates; and it has time and again been defined as a requirement in
philosophical rhetoric. How can this requirement be met? First, the
speaker should stick to everyday language instead of impressing by
figures and tropes. He should avoid, as Gottsched writes, “technical
terms” (Kunstwörter) and “speak the ordinary language (gemeine
Sprache) that everyone understands”.30 Speech should never be euphu-
istic but rather simple and sober. Second, natural speech is based on
knowledge. The speaker has to be well acquainted with the subject
matters at hand. This is why, ideally, he is a man of broad education.
Natural speech flows from factual content, and the capacity to speak
naturally flows from the domain-specific expertise of the speaker.
This has already been emphasized by Cicero,31 and Gottsched is
entirely in line with this tradition: to speak naturally a speaker has to
“follow his subject matter” (Materie) and to keep in his mind “no other
picture than the thing itself.”32
However, the assumption that natural speech originates from
knowledge poses a new problem: such knowledge will inevitably
include insights concerning the efficacy of speech in regard to human
sentiments, i.e., psychological insights. Gottsched explicitly assumes
that the excellent speaker must be well aware of the “excitements of
the mind” (Gemütserregungen) of his addressees.33 Thus the question of
howamanipulative stance on speech canbe avoidedbecomes onlymore
pressing: the very resource thatwas supposed to secure “true eloquence”
invites the misuse of the power of speech for purposes of manipulation.
Hence, there is another requirement: the speaker has to be distin-
guished by moral integrity. Only then will he make good use of
his knowledge. The true orator has to have, as Gottsched repeatedly
writes, “good intentions” (gute Absichten).34 This second requirement
is crucial since it not only affects the style of the linguistic performance,
the question whether it is artificial or natural, but rather its persuasive
30Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 41.
31Cicero, De oratore 2.56.
32Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 328 and 330.
33Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 162–192.
34Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 51–53; J. Chr. Gottsched, Akademische
Redekunst, zum Gebrauche der Vorlesungen auf hohen Schulen als ein bequemes Handbuch
eingerichtet und mit den schönsten Zeugnissen der Alten erläutert (Leipzig: Breitkopf,
1759), 28f.
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function, the question to what end speech is used. Eloquence, however
natural it may be, will be secured from being misused only where this
additional ethical requirement is satisfied, too.
Gottsched summarizes his rhetorical ideal using the classical for-
mula “good man, skillful in speech,” known from Quintilian’s
Institutio. Gottsched cites: “sit ergo nobis Orator, quem instituimus, is,
qui a M. Cicerone finitur, vir bonus, dicendi peritus.”35 Quintilian, of
course, had attributed the vir bonus-formula to Cato the Elder, in accord
with rhetorical tradition.36 In the section in Quintilian that Gottsched
refers the reader to (Inst. or. XI, 1), Cicero is mentioned but the passage
is missing. Obviously, Gottsched was thinking of a passage in
book XII: “sit ergo nobis orator, quem instituimus et qui a M. Catone
finitur, ‘vir bonus dicendi peritus’ [. . .]”, which Russells translates
as: “so let the orator whom we are setting up be, as Cato defines
him, ‘a good man skilled in speaking.’”37 So Gottsched inadvertently
turns Quintilian’s classical reference to Cato into a reference to Cicero.
Nevertheless, the formula expresses Gottsched’s idea of true elo-
quence. The orator has to meet two requirements: he has to be power-
ful in speech (dicendi peritus), and he has to bemorally good (vir bonus).
The persuasive speaker has to be rhetorically and ethically excellent.38
However, it appears that these virtues remain independent from one
another. “True eloquence,” as Gottsched has it, results from a combi-
nation of knowledge and formal know-how with morality, the latter
keeping the speaker from misusing his capacity and thus securing
the “good use” of speech. In the remainder of this article, I will attempt
to show that the ideal of speech implied in Kant’s remarks in §53 of the
third Critique can be read as a response to and, more specifically, a crit-
ical revision of precisely this notion of eloquence.
IV. CULTURE, NOT ART: KANT’S REJECTION OF
GOTTSCHEDIAN “TRUE ELOQUENCE”
The previous sections have shown why contemporary readers
were likely to take Kant’s denunciation of the “art of speech” as
35Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 51.
36See e.g., Virgil, Aeneid 3.193 or Seneca, Controversiae, 8–10.
37Quintilian, Inst. or. 12.1.1.
38It is no surprise that epigones like Baumeister (Anfangsgründe der Redekunst in
kurzen Sätzen) or Braun (Anleitung zur deutschen Redekunst) adopt Gottsched’s distinc-
tion virtually unaltered. In H. G. Schellhaffer the distinction reappears with minor
deviations; see Sätze der Redekunst (Hamburg: Piscator, 1760), 9.
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directed against Gottsched. The Redekunst is explicitly an ars oratoria,
and Gottsched is the chief representative of this art until the 1780s. In
the light of some further evidence, one may even argue that Kant
was actually thinking of Gottsched when he wrote §53 of the third
Critique.
First, Gottsched intends to secure his “true eloquence” by provid-
ing a technique of speech with “good intentions” (gute Absichten).
Kant, by contrast, regards artful speech as contemptible, even if the
particular intentions (Absichten) may, as hewrites, be “well intentioned
or even really good” (5:328n). Given the prominent role of the term
“intention” in Gottsched, this remark signifies that Kant might well
be responding to Gottsched in this passage. At least, he dismisses the
very solution to the challenge of rhetoric that Gottsched had
suggested.39
The suspicion is confirmed when Kant, two sentences later, goes
on to explain his own idea of speech: when he describes the vir bonus
dicendi peritus as “the speaker without art but full of vigor, as Cicero
would have him” (5:328 fn.), he too misattributes the Catonian phrase
to Cicero. Kant makes the same mistake Gottsched made in his
Ausführliche Redekunst.40 This supports the claim that there is a direct
link. Therefore, it seems likely that Kant’s version of the vir bonus is
intended to revise Gottsched’s version of this ideal; and in any case
Kant condemns precisely the idea of “true eloquence” that Gottsched
defends.
But for a clarification of his own idea it is vitally important to
understandwhy he could not accept the notion of “true eloquence” that
school rhetoric favored. After all, Gottsched did not defend a manipu-
lative “art of persuasion” but suggested binding speech to reason, truth
and morality. How could Kant be so bitter about this endeavor?
To settle this question, it is crucial to pay attention to the general
form any school rhetoric would have taken. The “art of speech”
(Redekunst) is, as Gottsched explicitly says, a doctrine of persuasive
speech, while “eloquence” (Beredsamkeit), when contrasted with the
“art of speech,” refers to a linguistic practice.41 This terminologywas very
common in Kant’s times; for example, Sulzer still defined the “art of
speech” (Redekunst) as a “theory of eloquence” (Theorie der Beredsamkeit)
39That Kant does not argue against a malicious but rather a well-intentioned art of
persuasion is also noticeable where he writes that it is not “necessary also to bring up
the machinery of persuasion” (5:327, emphasis added).
40If Kant studied Gottsched’s academic textbook, he would have read the very
same wrong citation (Akademische Redekunst, cited in n. 34 above, p. 45).
41Gottsched, Ausführliche Redekunst, 33; Gottsched, Akademische Redekunst, 25.
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and eloquence, in turn, as the capacity “to express one’s ideas in
speech,”42—that is to say, as a practice of speech. Gottsched’s
“art” (Kunst) is intended to refine the given practice of speech by
subjecting it to a system of rules. Like the Greek term techne or the
Latin ars, it refers to a theory-based practice.
For Kant, this implies that the “art of speech” is, by definition, a
mechanical art, i.e., an art that “merely performs the actions requisite
to make it [its object] actual” (5:305). It is a skill operating according
to hypothetical imperatives, conditional rules or prescriptions that
tell us how to achieve specific goals. Hence, this art cannot belong
to beautiful art. Since it connects speech to particular purposes, it
cannot exemplify a “purposiveness without purpose.” A piece of
discourse that is formed according to the rules of an art can never
be purposeful by virtue of its form alone. If speech proceeds accord-
ing to a doctrine of speech, it inevitably misses the requirements of
the beautiful.
But this is not all. The objects of the “art of speech” are judgments.
What the orator in this case aims at “making actual” are certain attitu-
des in his addressees. This is why the art of speech must not only fall
short of beauty but in fact be ugly and, more precisely, morally con-
temptible. From the viewpoint of a doctrine of eloquence, speech is a
means suitable for changing other people’s minds. This is what Kant
must be thinking of when he accuses this particular type of rhetoric
of applying the “machinery of persuasion” (5:305).43 While there is
nothing wrong with technique in general, the “art of speech” is despi-
cable since it takes an instrumental stance on the social practice of
communication. Thus, it essentially supports an instrumental attitude
to other persons and therefore tends to undermine their autonomy.
The devastating judgments on the ars oratoria in the third Critique have
to be read in this light: when Kant condemns eloquence “in so far as it
is understood as the art of persuasion” (5:327), his rejection is indeed
radical, since from his point of view, such artificial eloquence is unholy
by definition.
This explains why Gottsched’s Redekunst is indeed a paradigmatic
case of the art of speech that Kant rejects. Gottsched sees no problem in
taking a strategic or “mechanical” stance on communication where
42J. G. Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste in einzeln, nach alphabetischer
Ordnung der Kunstwörter aufeinanderfolgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vol. 4, (Leipzig:
Weidmann, 1794), 41.
43Kant is probably echoing the expression mechane peithous here that Socrates
uses in Plato’s Gorgias (459bf). For alternative explanations see Garsten, Saving
Persuasion, cited in n. 3 above, 88.
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“ordinary listeners” have to be enlightened. For him, the artful use of
linguistic means only has to be controlled by “good intentions.” But
in Kant’s view, such an art is deficient in its basic constitution. The fun-
damental flaw that language is regarded as a means cannot be cured
by constraining its use. Even if provided with ethical restrictions or
“good intentions,” Gottsched’s eloquence necessarily remains a
“mechanical art,” i.e., a method or technique. This cannot be adjusted
by subsequently injecting a dose ofmorality. In this way,morality only
draws the limit for a rhetorical method that might be evil in itself.
But, if this is right, what options does Kant have? As long as lan-
guage is taken as a device providing the speaker with certain means
that can be applied to attain certain ends eloquence is irreversibly
instrumental. This reveals how difficult the task is that Kant faces.
It seems that all speech will be purposive to some measure, since
speakers will be at least minimally aware of the instrumental use
of eloquence. It would be curious if Kant demanded the speaker to
drop back on naivety and become unconscious of linguistic efficacy.
“An art for being naïve is,” so he himself puts it, “a contradiction”
(5:335). Hence, the pivotal question is how a “non-instrumental
use” of speech is possible. To make sense of this notion is apparently
the main problem for any account of “Kantian eloquence,”44 and
one might be inclined to think that such a paradoxical notion cannot
be spelt out.
To pave the way for an answer, we should begin with the gen-
eral type of speech practice Kant must have in mind. As seen above,
there is a sharp distinction in the period’s terminology between
“eloquence” (Beredsamkeit) as a practice of speech and the “art of
speech” (Redekunst) as a doctrine or “theory of eloquence” (Theorie
der Beredsamkeit). This distinction is clearly presupposed by Kant
in the footnote in §53, which is not only indicated by the word
“Rednerkunst” itself but also by the fact that the contrasting word is
“Beredtheit” instead of “Beredsamkeit”: while the latter can still have
the sound of the technical term referring to the discipline of rhetoric,
the former unambiguously refers to practical eloquence. This distinc-
tion is also in play when Kant condemns eloquence, “in so far as it is
understood as the art of persuasion.”He could equally well have said
that eloquence deserves no respect, in so far as it takes the form of a
system of prescriptions or of an explicit techne. Therefore, it is clear that
Kant’s notion of eloquence, whatever it is, would have to be a practice
that is not based on any doctrine.
44Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, cited in n. 6 above, 54.
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In the Critique of Judgment, there is a distinction imposing itself at
this point: Kant introduces it after having declared that there cannot
be “any science (Wissenschaft) of the beautiful” (5:355). Since taste can-
not be determined by rules, the practice of beautiful art is based on
examples and paradigms; it is shaped not through a “method”
(Lehrart) but by virtue of a “manner” (Manier). A practice shaped this
way can also be termed a culture. The “propaedeutic for all beautiful
art,” Kant writes, “seems to lie not in precepts, but in the culture of
the mental powers (Gemütskräfte)” (5:355). In Kant, the beauty of art,
as opposed to the beauty of nature, has to be accomplished by a pro-
cess of cultivation. This cultivation is at the same time the only possible
propaedeutic of beautiful eloquence, i.e., of “rhetoric” (Rhetorik) in
Kant’s sense. If rhetoric must not be a mechanical art, a method of elo-
quence, then it can only be a beautiful art, as Kant explicitly says, and
this implies that it is generated by the “culture of mental powers.”
In other words, Kantian “true rhetoric” has to be a culture of speech.
It is eloquence built on a cultivation of the “powers of the mind,” as
opposed to eloquence built on a system of speech. The latter leads to
applying amethod according to certain purposes and is thus incurably
“mechanical.”Here, the speaker learns to regard language as a means
that can be used according to ends and conditional rules. But for Kant,
the only respectable way of refining one’s natural capacity of speaking
is the cultivation of the mind itself.45 In this perspective, any practical
training in eloquence detached from this cultivation has to be regarded
with contempt. For Kant, it would be the same kind of contempt as
emerges in the claim that lying is the “greatest violation of a human
being’s duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being” (6:429).
How did Kant conceive of this culture of speech? The field he
mentions in the Critique of Judgment is humanistic education (huma-
niora), which is supposed to stimulate the “sociability that is appro-
priate to humankind” (5:355). Other fragments of a culture of
speech can be found in the Anthropology, where Kant describes his
idea of communal dining.46 However, to understand how significant
practices like these are in Kant, his remarks on eloquence have to be
examined more closely. In particular, the role of morality has to be
45This is also reflected by the expression “speaking arts” (redende Künste), which
Kant introduces in §51 (5.321): while the ‘art of speech’ turns speech into an object and
is therefore essentially ‘mechanical,’ a ‘speaking art’ is a practice of speech that can, at
least potentially, be beautiful. Unfortunately, Guyer and Matthews translate ‘redende
Künste’ as ‘art of speech.’
467:278–282; see G. L. Ercolini, “Ethics Improper: The Embodied Ethics of Kant’s
Anthropology.” Review of Communication 12 (2012), 313–330 (pp. 321–325).
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clarified. Cato’s vir bonus-formula refers to a rhetorical ideal that is
essentially ethical, and for this reason, Quintilian adopts it. As the
“science of speaking well” (bene dicendi scientia), rhetoric has to com-
prehend “all virtues of speech” (orationis omnes virtutes) and therefore
also the “orator’s morals” (mores oratoris), which means that “only
the good man can speak well.”47 As will turn out in the remaining
sections, Kant stands very close to this idea.
V. “WITHOUT ART”: THE UNITY OF RHETORICAL AND
ETHICAL VIRTUE
According to Kant, the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the “speaker
without art but full of vigor,”will have “clear insight into the facts,”
“command” of “language in all its richness and purity,” “fruitful
imagination” and “lively sympathy for the true good.” This descrip-
tion entails a revision of Gottsched’s rhetorical ideal. In the “art of
speech,” the perfect speaker is rhetorically and ethically excellent,
but there is no intrinsic connection between these two qualities.
The orator has to be powerful in speech and also morally good, so
that he will not misuse his rhetorical capacity. This conception of
“true eloquence” defends a formal know-how simply limited by
morality. For Kant this is no option. In his view, it is impossible to
transform a “mechanical” technique of speech into respectable elo-
quence by providing it with good intentions. In the case of the ars
oratoria, morality will always be too late.
This signifies what the main challenge for Kant will be: he has to
ensure that eloquence andmorality do not fall apart. His vir bonus can-
not be a “good man” as far as morality is concerned and at the same
time “artful” as far as speech is concerned. Rather, ethical virtue and
rhetorical virtue must be of one piece. Given Kant’s idea of cultivation,
this is not surprising. In Kant, human beings are in need of being edu-
cated; they have the duty “to cultivate, civilize and moralize them-
selves through art and sciences” (7:324). This is why Kant’s idea of
Bildung, the German equivalent to the Latin cultura, points to the con-
ception of moral self-cultivation, which Kant develops in his doctrine
of virtue. Cultivation includes moralization. The moral judgment has
to be strengthened, so that human beings become capable of living
as free persons in a kingdom of ends. A Kantian “culture of speech”
would have to be an inherent part of this moral culture.
47Quintilian, Inst. or. 2.15.33f.; cf. 12.1.1–3.
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This is underscored by the way Kant explains the vir bonus for-
mula in §53: the ideal speaker has to have “sympathy for the true
good” (Herzensantheil am wahren Guten). The word Herzensanteil, not
commonly used in German, literally expresses a sympathy that is felt
in the “heart” (Herz) – a word Kant regularly uses when it comes to
questions of “virtue” (Tugend) in a narrow sense (5:178n; 5:273;
6:441). In other words, “virtue” has to be taken as habituated, embod-
ied morality here. The speaker needs to have a certain affection, a real
sympathy, since it does not suffice to speak in accordance with formal
principles. Kant’s vir bonus is informed by morality. His eloquence
implies the capacity to set the right ends because it is the result of
moral cultivation; this is why it does not have to be specifically connec-
ted to “good intentions.” In Kant’s view, it is a mistake to separate
rhetorical capacities and morality in the first place. Excellence in
speech can never be a formal skill; any formal idea of such excellence
even subverts the morality needed to “speak well.” Hence, Kant must
obviously be convinced that the “culture of the mental powers” is all it
takes for true rhetoric.When the vir bonus is speaking, this has “in itself
sufficient influence on human minds, without it being necessary also
to bring up the machinery of persuasion” (5:327).
Of course, this requires that cultivation implies broad education or
Bildung. In his explanation of the vir bonus formula, Kant mentions that
the speaker needs “insight into facts” (Sachen), i.e., a certain knowledge.
But it is important to see that Kant is not talking about formal skills at
this point. In the context of eloquence, the German word Sache does not
refer to brute facts but more regularly to matters of concern, e.g., in
court. The vir bonus is supposed to have insight into practical affairs.
Kant is referring to the same topic when, in a parallel explanation in
§53, he speaks of the “distinct concept (deutlicher Begriff) of these sorts
of human affairs” (5:327), i.e., the affairs debated in parliament and
courtrooms. This indicates that Kant’s speaker is required to have a rich
understanding of human practice. Of course he needs “domain-specific
knowledge,” as Stroud argues48 and asGottsched recommended, too,49
but more importantly he needs intellectual culture. The “good man”
is not only informed about certain states of affairs but he is a broadly
educated, experienced personality.50
48Stroud, “Kant, Rhetoric, and the Challenges of Freedom,” cited in n. 4 above,
188f.
49Gottsched, Akademische Redekunst, 39–45.
50That Kant’s vir bonus needs to have ‘distinct concepts’ of practical affairs can be
explained by reference to the regulative concepts that guide human practice. It is worth
noting that conceptual clarification is one of the general aims of the self-critique of reason.
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Another element mentioned above can be explained along the
same lines. The requirement to have language “at his command”
(in seiner Gewalt) is at first sight difficult to reconcile with a non-
mechanical picture of speech. But the speaker who has a language at
his full command will in fact not relate to language as to an external
system of speech. Quite on the contrary, mastery of a language is pro-
vided where a speaker has adopted a linguistic practice as his own, so
that it is natural for him to speak this language.
Kant remarks at one point that art always involves something
compulsory and requires a “mechanism,” since its spirit would other-
wise have no body and “evaporate.” In this vein, “correctness and
richness of diction” are prerequisites for poetry (5:304). In other words,
beautiful art has a mechanical basis, only this basis has become invisi-
ble. “In a product of beautiful art,” Kant writes, “one must be aware
that it is art, and not nature; yet the purposiveness in its formmust still
seem to be as free from all compulsion (Zwang) by arbitrary rules as
if it were a mere product of nature” (5:306). This description holds
for eloquence as well, insofar as it is, at least potentially, beautiful.
Language needs a mechanical basis. But whoever has a language at
his command “in all its richness and purity” is not just able to “make
use” of a linguistic system. Tomaster a language in this way, normally
the mother tongue, means to have incorporated a linguistic practice
into one’s understanding and worldview. It means to have made this
practice one’s second nature. Such proficiency enables the speaker to
express herself, without having to think of rules, as learners of this
language would have to. The rule-like aspect of language is suppres-
sed and the meanings of particular linguistic forms can be grasped.
A proficient speaker can understand and perform meaningful “speech
acts”; the constraint by conventions is not sensed anymore. In this
case, rules do not have a guiding but only a limiting function: the
speaker can speak freely and “without offense against the rules of
euphony in speech or of propriety in expression, for ideas of reason”
(5:327, emphasis added).51 This is why the speaker cannot relate to
This connection is also indicated by a passage from the preface to the second edition of the
first Critiquewhere Kant explains how difficult it was to present his thinking in a compre-
hensible way. In this regard, he remarks that he will leave all further work to others who
“have the happy combination of thorough insight (Gründlichkeit der Einsicht) with a talent
for lucid exposition” (B xliii). This clue to Kant’s speaker’s ideal precedes the explanations
under discussion here by more than ten years. And here, the word Einsicht refers to the
particular kind of “insight” the self-critique of reason provides.
51Looked at in this way, linguistic capacity is essentially built on reflective judg-
ment, which is basically the capacity to proceed “without rules.” The power of judg-
ment does not have its “own legislation” but still a “proper principle of its own,”
namely the principle of “seeking laws” (5:177). This is how free action in a sensible
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these rules in an instrumental fashion. Language is no external
means but has become part of who the speaker is.
These elements together constitute Kant’s account of natural
speech. Insight and linguistic proficiency contribute to the constitution
of the speaker’s identity, and thus they cannot conflict withwhat Kant,
in his discussion of lying, calls the “natural purposiveness of the spea-
ker’s capacity to communicate his thoughts” (6:429). In this perspec-
tive, speaking naturally means expressing oneself in a way that the
personality of the speaker is revealed in the form of speech. And given
that the speaker is virtuous, his way of speaking will naturally be
expressive of virtue.
Still, this cannot be the end of the story. The speaker, particularly
the speaker in parliament or in court, cannot be satisfiedwith speaking
in a morally cultured fashion. His speech must also have persuasive
force. Rhetorical excellence is normally taken as a kind of efficacy.
This is why Kant’s vir bonus is not simply supposed to be a speaker
“without art” but also “full of vigor” (Nachdruck). How does Kantian
eloquence gain “vigor”? This question is crucial for how Kant deals
with the challenge of rhetoric.
VI. “FULL OF VIGOR”: THE EFFICACY OF THE KANTIAN
ORATOR
The question how speech can gain vigor seems to be closely
connected to the basic question of the third Critique. How is it possible
to bridge the “incalculable gulf” (5:175f.) between nature and freedom?
What has to be explained is how the ideas of reason can be endowed
with reality and motivate human action; and this could be described
as the problem of how the ideas of practical reason can gain vigor.
In fact, in Kant’s practical philosophy, the term “vigor” (Nachdruck)
refers to the motivational force of reason.52 This reflects how aesthetics
world is possible. In speech, just like in arts, the mechanical provides the basis for
what is purposive in itself.
52Kant does not use the term Nachdruck very often, but where he does, it is clearly
linked to rhetorical force. In his precritical period, he uses the word to describe a reason-
ing that does not proceed according to geometrical rules but still has enough force to per-
suade a reasonable person (2:159). In the first Critique, the word refers to the expressive
power of language (B 650) and to the plausibility a proof gains when speculation is
connected to intuition (B 665). Later, theword appears in the context of laws or principles
that have to be enforced: in this vein, Kant combines it with “efficacy” (Wirkung) when he
explains how practical laws gain “efficacy and vigor” (B 617; see 4:389 and 5:25 for simi-
lar uses).
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in the eighteenth century inherits the tasks that used to be the business
of rhetoric – a process that is noticeable in Kant too.53
Hence, the way Kant’s speech gains vigor must be closely akin
to the way the ideas of reason gain motivational force, i.e., it must
rest on aesthetic grounds. This emerges in the fact that Kant himself
regards “rhetoric” (Rhetorik), which combines “practical eloquence”
(Beredtheit) and “well-spokenness” (Wohlredenheit), as a “beautiful
art” (schöne Kunst). Beauty is the “symbol of the morally good”
(Symbol des Sittlichguten) in the third Critique (5:353). This is essential
to how Kant endows the ideas of morality with reality, which makes
them become attractive for finite human beings. Given that “Kant inter-
prets aesthetic experience within a framework dominated by the pri-
macy of practical reason,”54 one may conclude that speech supports
morality by way of such experience. Thus, the symbolic function of
beauty is essential to how speech gains vigor in Kant: the rhetorical
force of morally cultured speechmust lie in its beauty,moral beauty thus
being the only rhetorical force Kant allows. For this reason, Kant’s
orator must be one who not only argues in favor of ideas of practical
reason – like a political orator who defends, e.g., the idea of freedom –
but one who renders these ideas effective, by virtue of a way of speak-
ing that is perceived as beautiful. This Kantian version of “true
eloquence” requires a way of speaking that not only rests on “insight”
into what is good and right but becomes itself a symbol of the morally
good. Such speech, one has to assume, “would shine like a jewel for
itself,” just as Kant says about the good will in his Groundworks (4.394).
But it is crucial to see that this connection between aesthetics and
ethics is without any guarantee. The connection between the good
and the beautiful, the right and the vigorous, is utterly fragile in Kant.
Any symbolic rendering is indirect; it is established when the power of
judgment connects “the object of a sensible intuition” to the “rule of
reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object” (5:352) that is
not given, i.e., an idea.55 This does not simply mean that the symbol
53P. L. Oesterreich, “Das Verhältnis von ästhetischer Theorie und Rhetorik in
Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, ” Kant-Studien 83 (1992), 324–335.
54P. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on aesthetics and morality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 115.
55In the connection to pure concepts, Kant presupposes a specific type of ren-
dering he takes from classical rhetoric: the hypotyposis. For helpful discussions, see
R. Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 202–218, or Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, cited
in n. 6 above, 30f. The figure can already be found in Baumgarten who understands
the hypotyposis as a sensuous representation of an abstractum (Aesthetica, § 733).
Kant explains the term by reference to Cicero’s De oratore (3.53.202) when he defines
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corresponds to its object in a more circuitous way. The difference is one
of function: moral ideas are exhibited by sensuous forms that will acti-
vate the “procedure of the power of judgment” operative in moral rea-
son. Here, aesthetic intuition accords with “the form of the reflection,
not the content” (5:351). In this vein, awhite lily can be a symbol of inno-
cence (5:302): when we perceive the lily as a purposeful form, i.e., as
beautiful, our state of mind resembles the one we are in when making
moral judgments related to innocence. The symbolic function is not
one of correspondence at all, it is grounded on analogy. Symbolic pre-
sentation provides intuitions that the reflective mind can regard as if
they were objects of moral reason. What such presenting shares with
moral reason is the form of a judgment. What cannot be represented
thus becomes a part of human experience.
As mentioned above, Kant’s vir bonus is required to have a
“fruitful imagination capable of presenting his ideas.” Since imag-
ination as such (Einbildungskraft) is defined as the “faculty of pre-
sentation (Darstellung)” (5:232), it is no surprise that speakers need
to have this quality. Inventio has always been an essential part of
rhetoric, and this tradition is carried on in the eighteenth century
under the heading of “imagination,” Gottsched again being an
example.56 So the interesting question at this point is what it means
that Kant’s speaker has to be able to present ideas. As seen above,
Kant demands that his speaker have a “distinct” understanding of
practical concepts. But how can this have a bearing on the force of
discourse, when practical or regulative ideas, which guide human
practice, can never be given in experience?
In Kant’s view, imagination is behind what is commonly called
“spirit” – Geist, in the sense of the French ésprit – namely the
it as sub aspectum subjecto (5:351). In this mode of presentation, something is ‘cast
under the view’ and presented in a visual fashion. But for the presentation of moral
ideas a particular kind of hypotyposis is needed that Kant calls “symbolic.” While
schematic hypotyposis is concerned with the concepts of the understanding, as is the
topic of the doctrine of schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason (B 176-B 187), sym-
bolic hypotyposis is concerned with making concepts of reason sensible: to this end,
an intuition (Anschauung) is “put under” (untergelegt) “a concept which only reason
can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate” (5:351). Thus, sym-
bolic hypotyposis can be regarded as an indirect presentation of concepts (5:352).
As such it provides a solution to the problem of how sensuous renderings of moral
ideas are possible, i.e., how these ideas can be made sense of and endowed with
motivational force. As Gasché emphasizes, the word ‘example’ does not capture
the very specific meaning of hypotyposis in Kant: it “applies exclusively to the pre-
sentation of pure concepts of understanding and reason through a priori intuitions.
It is this very limited, but also extremely essential type of presentation, one without
which our pure concepts would remain lifeless [. . .].” (Gasché, The Idea of Form, 210).
56Gottsched, Akademische Redekunst, 47f.
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“animating principle in the mind” (5:313). Thus, it can provide
speech with sensuous representations that will enliven speech. In
connection to linguistic renderings, this has a very concrete mean-
ing: a “fruitful imagination” is capable of “lively presentation in
examples” (5:327). Thus, it is examples that are supposed to make
speech forceful.57 Still, the simple use of examples, as recommended
by any school rhetoric,58 will not be suitable. Being a “productive
cognitive faculty” that is “very powerful in creating, as it were,
another nature” (5:314), imagination should do something different
than merely point to instances of a universal, which would turn
examples into means. The speaker has to demonstrate what it could
mean for practical ideas to have sensuous reality; i.e., he or she has
to make these ideas meaningful. In such speech, examples do not relate
to what they signify as means relate to ends. Instead, a presentation
of this particular kind deserves to be called a moral practice in its
own right. In a sense, such speech does not give examples of moral-
ity; it is itself such an example. It is an instance of virtuous speech,
which requires the speaker to be virtuous. The “fruitful imagination”
Kant’s speaker is supposed to have has to be embedded in a sense
for moral ideas, in a capacity for reflective judgments and in a cul-
tured “moral feeling” (5:356). Ideal speech, as Kant has it, does not
simply accord to moral principles; it is expressive of moral ideas. It
gives a sample of the actual practice of morality and is exemplary
of what morality can concretely mean.
VII. CONCLUSION: KANT’S MINIMAL RHETORIC
If this account is right, the kind of rhetorical efficacy Kant has in
mind must be utterly subtle. In his view, speech ideally has to exem-
plify particular judgmental forms that will make moral beauty per-
ceivable; and in this way only is the speaker allowed to endow
practical ideas with vigor. Is it justified, then, to say that Kant’s work
shows the outline of a “rhetoric”?
57In this connection, Stroud says that the “heart of Kant’s educative rhetoric” lies
in “the directed use [. . .] of linguistic devices to show the real possibility and desir-
ability of instantiating the moral disposition” (Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, cited
in n. 6 above, 125). Examples seem to be central to Kant’s account indeed. But for
the reasons stated above, I do not believe that Kant would have been comfortable
with Stroud’s instrumental descriptions.
58Gottsched, Akademische Redekunst, cited in n. 34 above, 145–148.
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Those who would like to continue using this word might empha-
size that, in its history, rhetoric has in fact often been regarded as an
ethical culture of speech. It is not even uncommon that the idea of
ars or techne is rejected within classical rhetoric itself: Cicero, for exam-
ple, emphasizes that a rhetorical system (ars) can never suffice to
achieve practical eloquence.59 Mere prescriptions (praecepta) will not
lead to the kind of universal education that true rhetoric aims at.
Perfection in speech does not derive from a certain technique but from
a way of living (vita) and from the morals (mores) of the speaker.60 Just
like Kant, Cicero recommends a rhetorical practice “without art.” By
vehemently rejecting the rationalist rhetoric of his times, Kant might
in fact defend a particular version of classical rhetoric that centers
around the idea of a culture of speech. And when in the footnote to
§53 he mentions that Cicero did not “always remain true to this ideal,”
he might be alluding to the fact that Cicero was nevertheless often
concerned with questions of ars.
Yet, Kant’s opposition to the “art of speech” is obviously more
radical than Cicero’s. Every attempt to reconstruct a clear-cut “rheto-
ric” from Kant has to keep in mind that Kant would never have wan-
ted his aesthetic idea of speech to be retransformed into a rhetorical
system. Not only is there no eloquence apart from virtue in Kant,
which is why a badman, even if his actions accordwith the categorical
imperative, cannot provide symbols of morality. There is also substan-
tial reason to believe that Kant was convinced that speaking according
to the rules of an “art of speech” is bad under any circumstances. The
speaker has to be guided by a cultured moral sense alone, i.e. he has
to be a vir bonus, so that his speech becomes expressive of morality;
and he cannot be a vir bonus when he refines his natural capacity for
speaking by studying textbooks of rhetoric.
Strictly speaking, the vigor deriving from personified ideas of rea-
son is the only kind of rhetorical efficacy Kant allows. But unlike any
way of speaking with a calculated efficacy, the persuasive force of this
minimal rhetoric cannot be guaranteed in anyway. Just as we can only
hope that the beautiful and the good are one, it is never certain that the
goodman’s speechwill be efficacious. This particular kind of vigor can
only be hoped for.
59Cicero, De oratore 1.107–109 or 145f.
60Cicero, De oratore 1.68f.
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